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CHAPTER II

THE FACT OF MORAL INTEGRATION AND ITS MEASUREMENT

A TERM like "moral integration" is a scientific concept. It points to something believed to be important in understanding and in generalizing what happens in social groups. Since one cannot see or hear or touch this something, there arises the very proper question: How do we know it exists? This problem is not peculiar to the social sciences. The atom is not present to the senses either, but physicists have a very definite concept of its character and structure. We accept the existence of the atom because a great many things are thereby explicable which otherwise would be inexplicable. Its nature is inferred from the manner in which events that can be sensibly perceived occur. In order that we can think about this unsensed object, communicate ideas concerning it, put it into generalizations as one of their terms, and develop tests of its reality, we give it the label "atom." The meaning of the term evolves, but at any given time the concept is a clustering of inferred characteristics that fit both practical experience and accepted theory.

With respect to moral integration there is a tremendous amount of common-sense experience that testifies to the reality behind the concept, but this field of experience has been little probed by research. In view of the widespread appreciation that team "spirit" is important to success in athletics, it is surprising that more social scientists have not followed the path blazed by the great French sociologist, Émile Durkheim. In his *Suicide* and *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* he demonstrated the importance of moral integration, first, to the individual and, second, to society. In this country good work has been done by Elton Mayo and his followers at the Harvard Business School[1] and by the late Kurt Lewin and his students, a group of whom now constitute the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan.[2] Both of these research teams have been interested primarily in small groups, like the factory department or the nursery school. They have made contributions of great theoretical importance to our knowledge of how such groups function.

Although it is true that small groups are the seedbeds of character, the most challenging problems of moral integration today seem to lie in very large groups. It is these that have been fostered by modern means of transportation and communication, and it is in these that social cohesion breaks down most frequently. To investigate the grounds of moral integration in these large, loose aggregates is therefore essential. The present study is designed to make a contribution in this direction.

The best way in which to determine whether a concept represents something real is to find out whether events occur as you would expect them to if that something exists. It was precisely in this way that physicists demonstrated the value of the concept of electricity. To this day there is

[1] Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (New York, 1933), and *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Boston, 1945); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Boston, 1934); Fritz Jules Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, 1941).

[2] Kurt Lewin, *Authority and Frustration* (Iowa City, 1940), *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York, 1948), and *Field Theory and Social Psychology* (New York, 1949); Ronald Lippitt, *Training for Community Relations* (New York, 1949); Leon Festinger, Stanley Schacter, and Kurt Back, *Social Pressures in Informal Groups* (New York, 1950).

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much that is mysterious about electricity, but there is no doubt that there is such a phenomenon, because so many occurrences can be explained by it.

With respect to moral integration in cities, the simplest way to attack this preliminary question seemed to be to determine whether cities that scored high in one characteristic presumably symptomatic of moral integration also scored high in other characteristics that should be symptomatic of it. That is like determining whether bodies that register a high electrical charge by one test do so by other tests, thus proving the reality of electricity. At the beginning of any such line of research the difficulty is that none of the tests is of known validity, so that one has to proceed by trial and error, gradually isolating the essence of the phenomenon under investigation at the same time that some measurements of it are found superior to others. This task is not quite so hopeless as it looks, because the investigator is guided by existing theory.

In the present instance the process was initiated by constructing a Welfare Effort Index from the figures contained in a publication of the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Labor, entitled *The Community Welfare Picture as Reflected in Health and Welfare Statistics in 29 Urban Areas, 1938*. This index took into consideration both the per capita expenditures raised from local sources and the percentage of total expenditures raised locally (as against that contributed by the state or federal government). It was also corrected for the level of living of the community, so that the less prosperous cities would not be penalized on that account.[3] The assumption behind the Welfare Effort Index was that in cities whose moral integration was high there would be a strong welfare effort, since the people would have a sense of responsibility for the well-being of their neighbors. The greater the moral integration, the more the citizens would sacrifice their private interests for the public interest.

[3] See Appendix I, Sec. A, for a statement of the computation of the Welfare Effort Index.

Scores on the Welfare Effort Index were determined for twenty-eight of the twenty-nine cities, as shown in the first column of Table 1. Washington, D.C., was omitted

TABLE 1

WELFARE EFFORT AND CRIME IN TWENTY-EIGHT URBAN AREAS

Urban Area	Welfare Effort Index (1938)	Crime Index (1936–40)
Buffalo	266.7	9.14
Syracuse	235.6	11.99
Springfield (Mass.)	233.5	14.79
Milwaukee	199.5	6.22
Cincinnati	191.5	42.23
Baltimore	166.1	24.43
Richmond (Va.)	153.6	54.25
Providence	148.2	10.20
Hartford	139.0	27.18
Indianapolis	132.0	47.90
Cleveland	131.2	33.79
Los Angeles	115.5	43.36
Louisville	111.6	59.83
Canton	105.0	32.91
San Francisco	101.7	29.81
Bridgeport	101.4	17.35
Dayton	93.2	26.15
St. Louis	89.9	19.46
Kansas City (Mo.)	83.3	35.32
Columbus (Ohio)	72.2	55.54
New Orleans	71.7	15.07
Grand Rapids	65.7	21.73
Wichita	65.2	19.34
Atlanta	63.5	77.46
Houston	63.5	41.89
Birmingham	62.8	48.54
Dallas	50.7	45.86
Wilkes-Barre	50.6	14.18

because there is no distinction there between local and federal governmental contributions. It will be noticed that the differences in welfare effort were very considerable. Generally speaking, the level of living and percentage of expenditures raised locally tended to offset each other because the federal government, during the depression, helped most those communities that could least afford to help themselves. The order of the cities in terms of the per capita amounts raised locally was not very different from that shown.[4]

Since no other good positive index of

[4] See Table I, Appendix I, Sec. A.

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moral investigation presented itself, it was decided to construct a negative one from Federal Bureau of Investigation crime statistics. The figures for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, robbery, and burglary were used.[5] The assumption behind this procedure was simply that, the more the people of a community are knit together in a real moral order, the less they will violate one another's persons or property.

The crime scores for the twenty-eight cities are shown in the second column of Table 1. The frequency of crime is seen to vary much more than does the intensity of welfare effort. There is a tendency for those cities that show strong welfare efforts to have low crime rates and for those with a poor score in welfare effort to have high crime rates. The relationship, however, is not a very close one, since the correlation between the two series is only −.39. (A perfect negative correlation would be −1.00.) This means that the two series have some element in common—presumably the state of moral integration of each of the cities—but that other and differing elements are also included in them.

One factor that may be lessening the correlation between the two is a failure of the figures to represent the true situation in the several communities. The FBI has had considerable trouble getting cities to report the crimes known to the police accurately and comparably from one city to another. There is no way of determining which cities are erring in this respect (the FBI cannot make public any misgivings it may have), and therefore we may have included cities for which the Crime Index is misleading. The Welfare Effort Index is probably based on accurate reporting, since a special study was made by the Department of Labor staff; but there is the real possibility that a significant differential aspect of welfare effort in the various cities was missed. In all communities there is much private welfare work done by neighborhood groups, churches, and the like that would not register in the figures gathered. It is likely that the proportion of such work is relatively greater in smaller cities than in larger. Hence there is some ground for the supposition that the welfare effort scores are affected by a systematic error.

Later work with the Crime Index and the Welfare Effort Index makes it seem probable that another reason for the only moderate correlation between them is that each represents a single aspect of moral integration and that these two aspects are somewhat independent of each other. Crime seems to be a good negative index of the habitual moral integration of a city; welfare effort, a good positive index of the intentional moral integration. It is a somewhat parallel case to the relationship in the body between the vegetative nervous system and the central nervous system. The vegetative system takes care of the routine bodily processes—digestion, circulation, and the like—at the subconscious level. This is analogous to the forces that make for lawful conduct in the normal community. The central nervous system controls the problem-solving behavior of the organism as a whole. This is very much like the welfare effort of a city. Either in the case of the physical organism or in the case of an urban community, both the routine and the problem-solving processes are necessary to effective functioning of the whole. Though each alone is an inadequate index of the over-all condition, a combination of them may be reasonably satisfactory.

Since the negative correlation between welfare effort and crime was not large enough to prove that moral integration is a real factor in events, I sought to substantiate the importance of the concept another way. I decided to turn to the data of Dr. Thorndike's studies previously mentioned. Some of the items that he used seemed to me suitable as rough measures of moral integration (though only four of these were in his "goodness" score). A comparison of the cities on these items should confirm or refute the belief that I was successfully isolating moral integration through the Wel-

[5] See Appendix I, Sec. B, for a statement of the computation of the Crime Index.

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fare Effort Index and the Crime Index. As a preliminary to this comparison I decided that it would be well to separate the cities that were consistent in their scores on welfare effort and crime from those that were inconsistent. Normally this would not be justifiable in scientific work, since in a sense it loads the dice. I deemed it proper at this elementary stage of work, however, because I believed that the inconsistency of certain cities indicated that other variables besides moral integration were having their maximum effect in those cities. Since I wanted to test the accuracy of my rating on moral integration, I omitted them.

TABLE 2

CLASSIFICATION OF TWENTY-EIGHT URBAN AREAS ACCORDING TO RANK ORDERS ON THE WELFARE EFFORT INDEX AND THE CRIME INDEX

Urban Area	Welfare Effort Rank	Crime Rank*	Mean Rank
	"Consistent" Cities		
Well integrated:			
Buffalo	1	2	1.5
Milwaukee	4	1	2.5
Syracuse	2	4	3.0
Springfield (Mass.)	3	6	4.5
Providence	8	3	5.5
Moderately integrated:			
Baltimore	6	12	9.0
Hartford	9	14	11.5
Bridgeport	16	8	12.0
Cleveland	11	17	14.0
St. Louis	18	10	14.0
Canton	14	16	15.0
San Francisco	15	15	15.0
Dayton	17	13	15.0
Los Angeles	12	21	16.5
Kansas City (Mo.)	19	18	18.5
Poorly integrated:			
Houston	24.5	19	21.75
Columbus (Ohio)	20	26	23.00
Dallas	27	22	24.50
Birmingham	26	24	25.00
Atlanta	24.5	28	26.25
	"Inconsistent" Cities		
Crime score shows more integration than welfare effort score:			
New Orleans	21	7	14.0
Wichita	23	9	16.0
Grand Rapids	22	11	16.5
Wilkes-Barre	28	5	16.5
Welfare effort score shows more integration than crime score:			
Cincinnati	5	20	12.5
Richmond (Va.)	7	25	16.0
Indianapolis	10	23	16.5
Louisville	13	27	20.0

* Rank 1 means least crime.

Table 2 classifies the twenty-eight cities into consistent and inconsistent according to their ranks in welfare effort and crime. The maximum rank difference that was deemed to be compatible with consistency was 9 places (Los Angeles). It will be noted that the breaks in mean rank between the three subclasses of the consistent cities are well marked. It seemed possible to use these three broad groups—well integrated, moderately integrated, and poorly integrated—in making a test with Thorndike's data. Unfortunately he omitted the largest cities from his studies, so that Buffalo, Baltimore, Cleveland, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Los Angeles had to be dropped out.

The most serious objection to the use of Thorndike's material was that his study centered around the year 1930, whereas the crime and welfare effort data that I had gathered centered around 1938. The greatest depression in the history of the United States had intervened. Would the character of cities have changed so markedly in the interim as to rule out the possibility of testing 1938 ratings of moral integration on 1930 data? Though admitting that change might be great, I was confident that cities had distinctive characters that would persevere even through such hectic years.

Of the 274 items concerning 310 cities upon which Thorndike gathered full information, only 14 seemed so immediately pertinent to the question of moral integration as to afford the possibility of validating the rating of the 14 consistent cities.[6] There

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were 7 items which a priori should be positively correlated with the three degrees of integration, and 7 which should be negatively correlated therewith. Two of the negative items—that for deaths from syphilis and that for deaths from gonococcus infections—were combined, so that Table 3, which presents the negative series, has only six columns.

TABLE 3

RATES EXPECTED TO HAVE A NEGATIVE RELATION TO MORAL INTEGRATION FOR FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO TENTATIVE LEVELS OF MORAL INTEGRATION*

City	Homicides per 10,000 Population per Year	Suicides per 10,000 Population per Year	Illegitimate Births per 10,000 Population per Year	Deaths from Syphilis and Gonococcus Infections per 10,000 Population 15 Years of Age and Over per Year	Percentage Secondhand-Store Sales of Retail Sales	Percentage Chain-Store Sales of Retail Sales
Well integrated:						
Milwaukee	0.31	1.94	4.11	0.91	0.19	20.70
Syracuse	0.35	1.54	6.00	1.90	0.30	16.62
Springfield (Mass.)	0.15	1.51	0.60†	0.65	0.30	23.29
Providence	0.26	1.31	4.31	1.02	0.48	24.92
Mean	0.27	1.58	3.76	1.12	0.32	21.38
Moderately integrated:						
Hartford	0.35	1.62	5.14	2.17	0.27	19.59
Bridgeport	0.29	1.92	2.27	1.65	0.12	31.50
Canton	1.00	1.56	4.26	1.53	0.41	22.24
Dayton	0.92	1.69	4.73	2.30	0.43	22.63
Kansas City (Mo.)	2.37	2.30	14.41	1.66	0.59	21.22
Mean	0.99	1.82	6.16	1.86	0.36	23.44
Poorly integrated:						
Houston	2.79	1.98	6.95	3.12	0.41	19.94
Columbus (Ohio)	0.98	1.92	7.95	1.84	0.49	26.81
Dallas	2.46	1.96	11.72	2.41	0.76	27.14
Birmingham	4.88	1.64	18.40	3.41	0.46	23.74
Atlanta	4.68	1.90	12.10	3.20	0.88	27.55
Mean	3.16	1.88	12.82	2.80	0.60	25.04

* For method of computing these rates see Appendix I, Sec. C.
† Estimated by Thorndike.

It is easy to understand why it was thought that homicides, suicides, illegitimate births, and deaths from venereal infections should give some indication of the degree of moral integration. The assumption behind the inclusion of sales in secondhand stores is less obvious. It was simply that movement of people in and out of a city, which would be reflected in secondhand-store sales, is inimical to a high degree of moral order. The last item, the proportion of retail trade through chain stores, was included on the assumption that in a morally well integrated community people would tend to remain loyal to local merchants.

The results in Table 3 bear out in considerable measure my expectations. The homicide figures are not surprising when it

[6] Unpublished data used in the preparation of Dr. Thorndike's *Your City* were kindly made available by him. The exact manner in which these data were utilized is set forth in Appendix I, Sec. C.

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is recalled that the cities are arranged according to two index scores, one of which is crime. The illegitimate birth rates and venereal death rates vary in the manner anticipated. The suicide rates and second-hand-store sales give only moderately confirmatory results.* The assumption with respect to chain-store sales appears to be the shakiest of all. Although the differences occur in the manner expected, they are so small as to be meaningless.

The other side of the picture is shown in Table 4. The first three items were expected to vary directly with moral integration, because one factor in the size and stability of a family is the degree of community interest and support. The reason for the inclusion of efforts to support public services is obvious. These indexes were obtained by dividing the amounts spent from tax funds for the several purposes by the per capita retail sales of the community, in order to equate for ability to pay.

If one looks at the means for the three groups of cities in the various items, one sees that, for all but that concerning libraries and museums, the trend is as expected. The differences in Table 4, however, are smaller than in Table 3, so that the evidence for the validity of our original ordering of the cities as well integrafted, moderately integrated, and poorly integrated is not quite so great.

TABLE 4

RATES AND INDEXES EXPECTED TO HAVE A POSITIVE RELATION TO MORAL INTEGRATION FOR FOURTEEN "CONSISTENT" CITIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO TENTATIVE LEVELS OF MORAL INTEGRATION*

City	Births per 1,000 Females Aged 20–44 per Year	Median Size of Family	Percentage Homes Owned by Occupants	Indexes of Efforts To Support Various Public Services			
				Schools	Recreation	Libraries and Museums	Sanitation, Health, and Public Safety
Well integrated:							
Milwaukee	40.5	3.35	42.3	50.52	11.49	2.10	25.79
Syracuse	46.0	3.21	45.0	56.34	4.47	2.30	14.43
Springfield (Mass.)	46.2	3.28	34.8	55.79	6.74	3.44	16.02
Providence	54.4	3.41	32.2	47.49	4.48	0.74	16.02
Mean	46.8	3.31	38.6	52.54	6.58	2.14	18.07
Moderately integrated:							
Hartford	57.6	3.30	21.9	47.88	7.24	1.62	12.95
Bridgeport	50.0	3.49	29.5	52.38	4.83	3.51	12.26
Canton	42.3	3.35	52.7	58.77	2.28	0.86	6.94
Dayton	40.0	3.12	47.4	46.63	3.02	4.31	11.01
Kansas City (Mo.)	31.4	2.85	39.0	34.94	4.16	1.71	7.95
Mean	44.3	3.22	38.1	48.12	4.31	2.40	10.22
Poorly integrated:							
Houston	.....	3.10	38.8	35.88	2.70	0.86	10.00
Columbus (Ohio)	37.5	3.03	42.8	46.85	1.43	1.12	9.60
Dallas	.....	3.10	37.3	33.38	3.71	0.44	9.41
Birmingham	40.0	3.27	33.6	49.30	2.19	2.19	10.79
Atlanta	39.9	3.17	29.0	34.15	1.29	1.29	10.34
Mean	39.1	3.13	36.3	40.11	2.26	1.18	10.03

*For method of computing these rates see Appendix I, Sec. C.

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However, the fact that thirteen out of fourteen indexes show the expected trends, either positive or negative, is fairly conclusive. Cities that are really different with respect to moral integration must have been placed in the three groups. In other words, the Welfare Effort Index and the Crime Index together must indicate quite well the adequacy of a city's moral order.

It may be worth while now to return to the inconsistent cities and see whether Thorndike's data throw any light upon why they are so. Table 5 gives the data for these cities with respect to the three negative series and the two positive series that showed the closest relation to moral integration in the consistent cities. The means of the well-integrated, moderately integrated, and poorly integrated consistent cities are given for comparative purposes. It is immediately apparent that New Orleans is out of line with the other three in its group. Actually, suspicion regarding the reporting of crime in New Orleans was aroused when the Crime Index was constructed. The figures showed that that city had only two robberies and eight burglaries for every murder. The average for all cities was ten robberies and sixty burglaries per murder. It seems certain that New Orleans did not report its robberies and burglaries correctly, and we have therefore dropped it from further consideration. The rates for the other three cities are averaged without New Orleans.

Wichita, Grand Rapids, and Wilkes-Barre seem to form a fairly homogeneous group. The original inconsistency between their good showing on the Crime Index and their poor showing on the Welfare Effort Index is indicated not to have been an error, for here again they are inconsistent. Their scores on homicides and deaths from venereal disease would seem to indicate fair to good integration, while their scores on illegitimate births, expenditures for recreation, and expenditures for sanitation, health, and public safety would indicate fair to poor integration. This is not a clear contrast between "routine" and "intentional" moral integration as those terms were defined earlier, since illegitimate births would seem to reflect more a failure in routine organization than a failure in intentional organization. However, there is evidence here that these three cities have much more solidarity of a traditional or customary sort than of the sort reflected in welfare effort. This is probably in part because they are three of the smallest cities in this study. Before the depression they undoubtedly had less need than larger cities for public and private charitable organizations. They perhaps took care of much of their welfare need on an informal basis. When the depression struck, they may have been slower than the larger cities to mobilize their efforts. It would be putting it too strongly to call them complacent cities, but perhaps they might be termed passive ones.

Cincinnati, Richmond, Indianapolis, and Louisville represent the opposite situation. Their showing is relatively much better on the Welfare Effort Index than on the Crime Index. The data in Table 5 bear out in general the original classification. These cities are making real efforts to meet their problems, but the community life does not seem to have much moral integration of the routine sort. One thing about these four cities is immediately striking. They are all near the border between the North and the South. Indeed, they seem to tend to be like southern cities in their crime and like northern cities in their welfare effort. It may actually be a fact that the situation is a stimulating one, so that "intentional" moral integration outruns "routine" moral integration. This would square with Toynbee's theory of the challenge offered to frontier provinces or "marches" in the course of human history.[7] According to this hypothesis, these cities have been quickened, but so far not effectively.

The results of this preliminary work could be summarized as follows: (1) that a Crime Index and a Welfare Effort Index tend to

[7] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (6 vols.), II, 112–208; (1 vol. abridgment by D. C. Somervell), pp. 111–25.

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confirm one another and therefore to confirm the presence of the phenomenon here called "moral integration" but (2) that in some cases there is a degree of inconsistency between the scores that suggests that moral integration has two aspects, a routine and an intentional aspect, which normally are closely linked, but which may for special reasons become partially dissociated.

Since these results were highly tentative, and since no systematic work on the causes of different degrees of moral integration had been done, I set up, after an interval of military service, a second study. This was aimed to check the validity of the previous findings on a larger number of cities and to attack the problems of causation. Only the first of these objectives will be discussed in the present chapter.

TABLE 5

VARIOUS RATES AND INDEXES RELATED TO MORAL INTEGRATION FOR TWO GROUPS OF "INCONSISTENT" CITIES COMPARED WITH THE MEANS OF THREE GROUPS OF "CONSISTENT" CITIES

City	Homicides per 10,000 Population per Year	Deaths from Syphilis and Gonococcus Infections per 10,000 Population 15 Years of Age and Over per Year	Illegitimate Births per 10,000 Population per Year	Indexes of Effort To Support—	
				Recreation	Sanitation, Health, and Public Safety
	"Inconsistent" Cities				
Crime score shows more integration than welfare effort score:					
New Orleans	2.42	7.15	14.80	3.07	22.49
Wichita	1.06	1.55	11.80	4.46	5.60
Grand Rapids	0.17	1.02	9.15	4.26	10.70
Wilkes-Barre	0.54	0.93	9.11	2.63	6.51
Mean of last three	0.59	1.17	10.02	3.78	7.60
Welfare effort score shows more integration than crime score:					
Cincinnati	1.82	2.40	5.68	2.44	12.56
Richmond (Va.)	1.46	3.34	19.60	2.41	11.27
Indianapolis	1.10	1.58	6.20	5.10	14.62
Louisville	1.99	2.85	6.48	4.39	17.27
Mean	1.57	2.54	9.49	3.59	13.93
	"Consistent" Cities				
Well integrated	0 27	1.12	3.76	6.58	18.07
Moderately integrated	0 99	1.86	6.16	4.31	10.22
Poorly integrated	3.16	2.80	12.82	2.26	10.03

Several circumstances determined the character and scope of this second study. First, because census data are the richest source of information available on a large number of cities, the study was centered on the year 1940. Second, since data on one of the most likely causal factors, the movement of population in and out of the cities over a period of time, were not available for cities

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of less than 100,000, the study was limited to cities of more than that figure. Third, it was decided that the cities should be "independent" in the sense that they should not be close to other large cities. The reason for this limitation was that the moral integration of a city might be affected by causes emanating from large near-by centers of population. Cities like Minneapolis and St. Paul, Kansas City (Mo.) and Kansas City (Kan.), New York and Newark, and Los Angeles and Long Beach—thirty-nine cities in all—were dropped on this ground. The upshot of these and other necessary eliminations was that only forty-three "pure" cases were left for systematic analysis.[8]

It was hoped that other indexes of moral integration in addition to the two previously used could be validated in this second study, but these hopes were disappointed. Four of them were constructed and tested against the Crime Index, which was thought to be the most reliable single indicator of moral integration yet developed, but the linkages were found not to be close. It is a plausible theory that communities in which a higher percentage of newspapers are delivered to homes are better integrated than those in which street sales are more common, because then community news is shared by the whole family. But this proved to be a poor "hunch," probably because of differing costs of distribution in the various cities. Thorndike's data suggest that the per capita expenditures by the city on sanitation, health and hospitals, and recreation would be a good index, but in the 1940 figures cities known to be well integrated, like Milwaukee, did not show up well. This is perhaps because cities that already have built up a good welfare system do not need to spend heavily for this purpose currently. The proportion of husbands and wives in the population not living with their spouses seemed a likely negative indicator of moral integration, but this figure correlated with crime only +.32. This relationship was almost sufficient to suggest the use of this proportion as a third index, but not quite. The last one tried was the proportion of expenditures on commercial amusements to retail sales. This index seemed plausible on the theory that in morally integrated cities people would more often tend to find their recreation informally with friends. However, this proved an untenable theory, for there was practically no correlation with the crime rate.

In the second study, therefore, I fell back on a Crime Index and a Welfare Effort Index as a means of estimating the moral integration of each city. The Crime Index was computed as before.[9] But a new Welfare Effort Index had to be developed, since the Children's Bureau investigation only covered seventeen of the forty-three cities in the study. This new index was based on Community Fund figures and took into account the degree of achievement of the campaign goal, the proportion of local families giving, and the economic sacrifice involved.[10] This time the Welfare Effort Index correlated a little more highly with the Crime Index than in the first study: −.43 as compared with −.39. However, the two welfare effort indexes, computed for the seventeen cities common to the two studies, correlated with each other only +.46.

In Table 6 the Crime Index and the Welfare Effort Index for the forty-three cities have been so adjusted that they have the same mean and the same range of scores. The crime series has been reversed so that high scores indicate little crime. Although the relationship appears fairly close between the two series, there is the same tendency as before for some cities to be markedly inconsistent. Of the seven cities in the previous study that were inconsistent, only five appear in this one—Grand Rapids, Wichita, Richmond, Indianapolis, and Louisville. All show the same trends as before—Grand Rapids and Wichita to make a better crime score than welfare effort score, and the other three the reverse. This time,

[8] For a detailed discussion of the process of selecting the cities see Appendix II.

[9] See Appendix I, Sec. B.

[10] See Appendix I, Sec. D, for the method of computing this index.

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however, the inconsistencies of Grand Rapids and Indianapolis are not great, and that of Wichita only moderately large. Richmond and Louisville again show great inconsistency. Milwaukee, Baltimore, and Buffalo, cities that were labeled consistent before, now appear to be inconsistent. In the case of the first two, the trends now noted are merely an exaggeration of those that appeared before, but in the case of Buffalo there is a great change in the Welfare Effort Index. For this city it would be a mistake to rely upon either score, since we have no way of knowing which one to trust. Three cities not studied before—San Diego, Tacoma, and Chattanooga—appear to be inconsistent. Among the cities in this study, then, those that seem to be somewhat "passive" are Milwaukee, Buffalo, Wichita, San Diego, Baltimore, and Tacoma. They have better routine than intentional moral integration. The converse list is made up of Richmond, Chattanooga, and Louisville. They are the "quickened" ones. These terms should not be misinterpreted. All three of the quickened cities make a poorer over-all showing than do the passive cities. The point is merely that the former are evidently striving hard to overcome their low status, while the latter are to some extent resting on their laurels.

TABLE 6

MEASURES OF MORAL INTEGRATION, FORTY-THREE CITIES OF MORE THAN 100,000

City	Adjusted Crime Index	Adjusted Welfare Effort Index	Integration Index
Rochester	17.3	22.4	19.0
Syracuse	17.1	16.9	17.0
Worcester	14.8	19.6	16.4
Erie	15.0	18.6	16.2
Milwaukee	18.4	10.5	15.8
Bridgeport	15.6	14.8	15.3
Buffalo	17.8	9.9	15 2
Dayton	13.4	16.1	14.3
Reading	14.2	14.2	14.2
Des Moines	14.5	13.4	14.1
Cleveland	12.3	17.4	14.0
Denver	14.8	12.0	13.9
Peoria	14.4	12.5	13.8
Wichita	15.6	9.7	13.6
Trenton	12.6	13.7	13.0
Grand Rapids	14.5	9.3	12.8
Toledo	11.5	15.0	12.7
San Diego	15.5	6.5	12.5
Baltimore	14.2	7.6	12.0
South Bend	12.7	9.9	11.8
Akron	12.0	9.8	11.3
Detroit	12.4	8.6	11.1
Tacoma	13.3	6.1	10.9
Richmond (Va.)	7.4	16.4	10.4
Houston	9.4	12.0	10.3
Fort Worth	10.4	9.8	10.2
Flint	11.7	6.0	9.8
Oklahoma City	9.8	9.6	9.7
Spokane	9.7	9.4	9.6
Chattanooga	7.2	13.4	9.3
Seattle	8.9	9 2	9 0
Indianapolis	7.5	11.4	8.8
Nashville	8.2	9.5	8.6
Birmingham	7.9	8.7	8 2
Columbus	6.2	11.7	8.0
Dallas	9.4	5.2	8.0
Louisville	4.1	15 0	7.7
Portland (Ore.)	6.7	8.1	7.2
Jacksonville	6.2	5.5	6.0
Memphis	3.8	8 7	5.4
Tulsa	3 7	8.5	5.3
Miami	5.8	3.6	5.1
Atlanta	2.5	7.6	4.2

The third column in Table 6 gives a Moral Integration Index that was obtained by combining the Crime Index and the Welfare Effort Index. In the process of combination, however, the two constituent series were not weighted equally. By a rather elaborate calculation[11] it was decided that the Crime Index was more reliable than the Welfare Effort Index, and the crime scores were therefore given twice the weight of the welfare effort scores in the inclusive index of moral integration.

It is felt that the array of moral integration scores gives a quite accurate picture of the relative standing of these large cities. The differences from top to bottom are very great. Rochester and Syracuse have a much stronger moral order than Miami and Atlanta. To say this is not to praise or to blame, since Miami and Atlanta are undoubtedly subject to much greater stresses than are Rochester and Syracuse. But the difference is a fact, and a very important one. To the matter of causes we turn in the next chapter.

[11] See Appendix I, Sec. E, for an explanation of this calculation.

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